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Sharing Economy of Electric Vehicle Private Charge Posts 
 
Abstract: The increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) leads to heightened demand for the charging 
infrastructure. More and more EV drivers install private charge posts, which can now be shared with others 
through certain mobile apps. This emerging phenomenon is becoming a prominent part of the sharing 
economy. To examine the impacts of post sharing on EV charging market, this study establishes game 
theory models on consumer choices among private, public, and shared options. Such peer-to-peer sharing 
and collaborative consumption redistribute the installation and operation costs of private charge posts in 
proportion to their increased utilization. Numerical analyses suggest that the sharing mode provides a win-
win solution for charge post owners and non-owner consumers, as well as electricity distributors and public 
charging infrastructure operators. In the case of China, the estimated saving for charge post owners is 
between 20% and 50%, which can be translated into more non-government investment in the EV industry 
chain. The findings provide supporting evidence for policy-makers to promote private charge post sharing, 
especially with certain consumer subsidization at a reasonable level. 





The public attention to low-carbon emission and green travel promotes the diffusion of electric 
vehicles (EVs) in many countries and regions. Jumping from two million in 2016, global cumulative sales 
of EVs hit the milestone of five million in 2018 (IEA, 2017). Among them, two million were in China alone, 
as the government encourages consumers to purchase and use EVs with favorable policies like what many 
other countries do (MPS, 2019). The rapid expansion of the EV market, however, is curbed by the limited 
charging infrastructure. To solve the issue, the Chinese government set a goal of building 12,000 charge 
stations and 4.8 million charge posts, 500,000 public and 4.3 million private, by 2020 (NDRC, 2018a). As 
of May 2018, a total of 266,000 public and 304,000 private charge posts were established, indicating that 
the construction of public charging infrastructure is on track, but the progress of private posts lags far behind 
(NDRC, 2018b). 
Recently, peer-to-peer charge post rental emerged as a new form of sharing economy (Koç, Jabali, 
Mendoza et al., 2019). An EV driver who owns a private charge post can lease it during idle time through 
a sharing platform like the Tgood mobile app, as shown in Figure 1. Another non-owner driver enjoys a 
lower charging price than what the public infrastructure offers. With the additional leasing revenue, the 
installation of a private charge post becomes less of a burden to a consumer. The increased market 
competition will largely break down the current monopoly of public charging infrastructure, and enhance 




Fig.1. Tgood App for Charge Post Sharing 
Facing the competition from charge post sharing, existing market players have to adjust their 
strategies. For instance, public charging infrastructure operators need to reprice their services, and 
electricity distributors may adjust their rates. Such decisions must be based on a sound understanding of 
the new sharing economy. As charge post sharing becomes an indispensable link of the EV industry chain, 
it is also critical for policy-makers to offer guidance on the healthy development of this emerging market, 
such as consumer subsidization to speed up its growth. At present, few researchers have investigated the 
dynamics involved in the phenomenon, and this study attempts to fill in the research gap by examining 
private charge post sharing with game theory models. They provide insights on optimal pricing strategies 
of market participants as well as reasonable incentive programs that policy-makers may consider. The 
findings contribute to the literature of transportation policy with the evidence to support the sharing 
economy of private charge posts for the sustainable development of EV industry chain and urban 
transportation. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. It first reviews the literature on EV charging 
infrastructure and sharing economy. The understanding leads to the establishment of game theory models 
 Use shared charge posts 
Share my charge post 
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that benchmark the sharing economy of private charge posts against the traditional mode of public charging 
services. Numerical analyses reveal the equilibria in terms of how post sharing impacts consumer choices 
and pricing strategies. Then, consumer subsidization is incorporated into the models to assess its facilitation 
of the sharing economy. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed, followed 
by the conclusions. 
2. Research Background 
2.1 EV Charging Infrastructure 
By replacing fuel cars, EVs can effectively improve the air quality of metropolitan areas (Chemama, 
Cohen, Lobel et al., 2018). However, many consumers are hesitant to purchase and use EVs due to the lack 
of charging infrastructure and lengthy service stops, especially for long-distance driving (Kuppusamy, 
Magazine, & Rao, 2017). Extant studies explore different approaches to the facilitation of EV charging, 
such as demand forecasting (Moon, Park, Jeong et al., 2018), economic performance (Tong, Henickson, 
Biehler et al., 2017), location optimization (Wu & Sioshansi, 2017a, 2017b), power distribution (Kabli, 
Quddus, Nurre et al., 2019), charging strategy (Ucer, Kisacikoglu, Yuksel et al., 2019), and battery swap 
(Sun, Sun, Tsang et al., 2019). 
In addition to the construction of public charging infrastructure, the government plays an important 
role in promoting private post installation with consumer subsidies (Li, Zhan, Jong et al., 2016). Many 
developed countries like the USA, UK, Netherlands, Canada, France, Italy, and Norway have implemented 
such incentive programs (Rietmann & Lieven, 2019). Having the largest number of EVs, China also 
encourages EV owners to install private charge posts with an action plan, yet local administrations are still 
waiting for more concrete policy guidelines (NDRC, 2018a). Although consumer subsidization is helpful 
at the beginning, sufficient government funding may not be available to support large-scale construction of 
charging infrastructure (Li, Zhan, Jong et al., 2016). For the sustainable development of the EV industry 
chain, more innovative approaches are proposed (Helveston, Liu, Feit et al., 2015). For instance, researchers 
explore crowdfunding for public charging infrastructure to supplement governmental funding (Zhu, Zhang, 
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Lu et al., 2017). EV charging infrastructure public-private partnership (EVCI-PPP) is another approach to 
attract private capital with a lucrative return (Yang, Long, & Li, 2018; Zhang, Zhao, Xin et al., 2018). Both 
crowdfunding and EVCI-PPP provide an opportunity for individual investors to enter the arena of public 
charging infrastructure (NDRC, 2018a). By July 2017, 13 EVCI-PPP projects had been successfully 
implemented in China (Yang, Long, & Li, 2018).  
Meanwhile, the number of private charge posts in China exceeded that of public ones in 2018 
(NDRC, 2018b). Under this trend, mobile app platforms like Tgood emerged recently for owners to lease 
charge posts to others during idle periods. The sharing mode helps more EV consumers meet their charging 
demand by strengthening equipment utilization. As potential leasing revenues make the installation of 
private charge posts more attractive, consequential widespread ownership will largely solve the insufficient 
infrastructure issue. Compared with the investment in public charge infrastructure, private post sharing 
provides a more direct avenue for consumers to participate in the EV charging market for utilization and 
monetary benefits. 
Due to its novelty, there have been only a few publications on the sharing of private charge posts. 
Based on the business model of peer-to-peer sharing and collaborative consumption (P2P SCC), one study 
proposed the use of new service development and provider assessment methods for process design (Plentera, 
Chasina, Hoffena et al., 2018). As for the utilization of shared posts, non-deterministic polynomial modeling 
was used to match potential demand and supply to the greatest extent (Gong, Tang, Buchmeister et al., 
2019). Due to the dynamic nature of this emerging market, however, it is not clear what the optimal pricing 
strategies for market participants, especially the owners who share their charge posts.  
In recent years, game theory modeling is becoming notable in the field of transportation research 
(Avraham, Raviv, & Khmelnitsky, 2017; Shao, Xu, Yang et al., 2020; Xu & Huang, 2014). So far, two 
publications have applied this methodology on the phenomenon of charge post sharing. One established a 
bilateral bargaining game for optimal pricing strategy based on the relationships among charge post owners, 
electricity distributors, and EV drivers, yet leaving out the major market players of public charging service 
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providers (Zhao, Zhang, Zhu et al., 2020). The other set up a non-cooperative two-matrix game on the 
competition between private charge post leasers and public service providers for EV drivers who do not 
have their own posts (Zhao, Zhang, Yang et al., 2020). 
In reality, many EV drivers who install private charge posts still have the need to rent others’ or use 
public charging services when they are away from home. Thus, it is necessary to consider all three options 
that EV drivers have in game theory modeling: installing (and sharing) private posts, renting private posts, 
and using public posts. The incorporation of such a comprehensive market structure distinguishes this study 
from the aforementioned studies that focus on the first two and last two options, respectively. It will develop 
a game theory model for a market where public charging infrastructure and private post sharing co-exist, 
while consumers can decide whether to build their own posts or rent from others in addition to the public 
option. 
2.2 Sharing Economy 
Enabled by platforms like Tgood, charge post sharing is essentially a new form of sharing economy. 
There are generally three types of sharing economy: on-demand rental network, on-demand service 
platform, and peer-to-peer resource sharing (Benjaafar & Hu, 2019). An on-demand rental network features 
an organization’s leasing of products, such as bikes (Kabra, Belavina, & Girotra, 2018) and cars (Lu, Chen, 
& Shen, 2017), to be shared with a large population. An on-demand service characterizes an online platform 
matching freelance workers and target customers, as instantiated by Uber and Lyft (Cohen, Fiszer, & Kim, 
2018). Peer-to-peer resource sharing is enabled by an online platform matching buyers and sellers (a seller 
at one time can be a buyer at another) for repeat-use resources, and Airbnb is an example (Fradkin, Grewal, 
Holtz et al., 2015).  
Private charge post sharing is a form of peer-to-peer resource sharing as owners may use others’ 
posts to charge their EVs. It allows a non-owner consumer to enjoy a lower charging rate than a public 
service provider’s and helps an owner consumer cover post construction cost. More specifically, private 
charge post sharing is a P2P SCC service as owners are also consumers on platforms like Tgood (in contrast 
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to Airbnb), enabling collaborative consumption along with resource sharing. As an attempt to investigate 
this new form of sharing economy under the P2P SCC framework, this study refers to relevant publications 
in transportation research as well as other fields. For peer-to-peer car rental, a dynamic model based on 
transaction-level data suggests that P2P SCC increases consumer surplus (Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015). 
For the optimal outcome of car sharing, it is necessary for the automakers that play the role of participating 
OEMs to pursue a clear dominant strategy by providing consumers fuel-efficient vehicles (Bellos, Ferguson, 
& Toktay, 2017). 
In more general P2P SCC settings, researchers explore the behaviors of market participants with 
different modeling approaches. An overlapping-generations model compares product pricing and consumer 
surplus before and after P2P SCC is introduced to a retail market, and the results suggest that the new mode 
benefits both retailers and consumers when the marginal production cost is relatively high, whereas retailers 
suffer profit loss with low-cost products for sufficiently impatient consumers (Weber, 2016). Similarly, an 
analytical framework of a P2P SCC market comprising a monopolist manufacturer and consumers shows 
that the sharing of high-cost products provides a win-win solution for them (Jiang & Tian, 2018).  
On the demand side, an equilibrium model of a P2P SCC market in which consumers can choose 
to own or rent products finds that the sharing of high-cost products boosts ownership rate and usage level 
(Benjaafar, Kong, Li et al., 2019). Another study explores the equilibria of P2P rental markets in the short 
run, in which ownership decisions are fixed, as well as in the long run, in which ownership decisions can 
be changed, and suggests that such a sharing economy always expands consumption and increases surplus, 
but ownership may increase or decrease (Filippas, Horton, & Zeckhauser, 2020). On the supply side, 
manufacturers as OEMs tend to enhance product quality and increase optimal price in the presence of the 
sharing market (Jiang & Tian, 2018). In a P2P SCC market comprising an OEM, a retailer and consumers, 
P2P product sharing is likely to increase the retailer's share of the gross profit margin in the distribution 
channel (Tian & Jiang, 2018).  
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Based on different modeling approaches, extant studies provide valuable insights on the market in 
which consumers purchase products (for self-use or leasing) or rent products from others. In a typical SCC 
market, however, P2P faces the business-to-consumer (B2C) competition, which is less represented in the 
literature. As for the sharing economy of private charge posts, consumers always have public charging 
infrastructure as an option in the decision-making regarding whether to install (and share) private posts, 
rent private posts, or use public posts. Thus, it is necessary to model the competition between B2C public 
charging and P2P post sharing together in the market.  
Two recent studies examined the B2C-P2P competition indirectly and directly, respectively, based 
on various assumptions. One established three separate models corresponding to the possible roles that an 
OEM plays as the seller in a P2P market, the renter in a B2C market, or both in a B2C-P2P market, and 
numerical analyses hinted at the positive interaction between P2P and B2C on OEM profitability if 
consumer heterogeneity and usage rate are sufficiently high (Abhishek, Guajardo, & Zhang, 2020). Though 
such an OEM-centered study suggests that the introduction of P2P does not necessarily conflict with B2C, 
it is up to the direct modeling of B2C-P2P competition to provide more conclusive and insightful findings. 
As an attempt, another study set up a “product-sharing market” comprising an OEM’s own platform for 
B2C and a third-party platform for P2P to determines the equilibrium rental price that is assumed to be 
uniform on different platforms eventually (Jiang, Tian, & Xu, 2021).  
Unlike regular products that are largely homogenous in a sharing market, public and private charge 
posts employ distinct technologies that lead to incompatible pricing mechanisms. This study adopts a truly 
heterogeneous market structure to free up the locking constraint of uniform pricing between B2C service 
and P2P rental in modeling. Thus, it is possible to incorporate the market competition between two distinct 
sources of supplies (rather than an OEM that provides the same products for B2C and P2P) in the assessment 
of their optimal pricing strategies respectively. Such an approach is crucial for the investigation of how the 
introduction of private post sharing will impact the EV charging market originally based on public charging 
infrastructure. Instead of OEMs, therefore, this study includes public charging infrastructure operators and 
electricity distributors as B2C players. 
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3. Benchmark Model 
By promoting peer-to-peer resource sharing in the EV charging market, the government can make 
less investment in the public infrastructure but meet consumer demand with enhanced private equipment 
utilization. This study focuses on how to encourage more EV drivers to install, share and/or use private 
charge posts with Stackelberg game models considering the dual identities of consumers as leasers and 
renters. In particular, it explores optimal pricing strategies for post rental and electricity distribution, along 
with consumer subsidization as critical success factors of private charge post sharing. 
3.1 Charge Post Installation and Operation 
The assumptions required for mathematical modeling are established below based on some 
simplifications of real-world scenarios. As shown in Figure 2, there are two types of charge posts: public 
(denoted as P) and private (denoted as I). Public posts use faster direct current (DC) charging at a higher 
equipment cost, whereas private posts use slower alternating current (AC) charging at a lower equipment 
cost. The varied charging speeds lead to different service volumes and values. Most EVs just need 1-2 hours 
to recharge with public posts, but over 7 hours with private posts. For example, it takes only 80 minutes to 
charge a Tesla Model S at a super charging station using DC, whereas 8 hours and 19 minutes with a private 
charge post using AC (Levinson & West, 2018).  
When consumers charge EVs with public and private posts, the main difference lies in charging 
durations. Accordingly, the value provided by a public post can be denoted as 𝑣𝑃, and the value provided 
by a private post can be denoted as 𝑣𝐼. The service volumes of public and private posts are about 18 and 
three times per day in theory, respectively, but the actual volumes are lower considering peak and off hours 
at different locations. Based on the battery capacity and charging speed of most common EVs, this study 
specifies average service volume, denoted as 𝜃𝑃 for public posts and 𝜃𝐼 for private posts, in numerical 
analyses. The charging price, denoted as 𝑃𝑃 for public posts and 𝑃𝐼 for private posts, includes electricity 




Fig.2. Charging supply chain in the benchmark case. 
The costs of running a charge post cover construction (equipment and labor), electricity, and 
operation. As DC charging equipment is more expensive than AC equipment, the construction cost of a 
public post is higher than that of a private post: 𝐶𝑃 > 𝐶𝐼. In terms of electricity, public posts use industrial 
rates whereas private posts use household rates, the former typically higher than the latter. In China, for 
example, the average industrial rate is about CNY0.8 per kWh, and the average household rate is about 
CNY0.5 per kWh (Zhao, Cai, & Ma, 2018). Correspondingly, the wholesale rate for public posts is higher 
than that for private ones: 𝑊𝑃 > 𝑊𝐼. Finally, 𝑂𝑃 and 𝑂𝐼 denote the operation costs for public and private 




Consumers using public 
charge posts 
Consumers using private charge posts 
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Table 1. Model notations. 
Symbol Definition 
Charge post operator: 
𝐶𝑃/𝐶𝐼  Construction cost of a public/private charge post 
𝐶𝑆  Upgrade cost for sharing a private charge post 
𝑂𝑃/𝑂𝐼  Operation cost of a public/private charge post 
𝑃𝑃/𝑃𝑆  Charging price of a public/private charge post 
𝑁𝑃/𝑁𝐼  Number of public/private charge posts 
𝜃𝑃/𝜃𝐼  Average charging service volume 
𝜋𝑂  Operator profit 
Electricity distributor: 
𝑐  Marginal cost of electricity distributor 
𝑊𝑃/𝑊𝐼  Electricity rate for a public/private charge post 
𝜋𝐷  Distributor profit 
Consumer: 
𝑣𝑘  Value of a post k based on charging speed, 𝑘 ∈ {𝑃, 𝐼, 𝑆, 𝐼𝑆} 
𝑈𝑘  Service utility of a post k considering user convenience, 𝑘 ∈ {𝑃, 𝐼, 𝑆, 𝐼𝑆} 
3.2 Consumer Behavior in the Benchmark Case 
Before the emergence of private post sharing, an EV driver has two charging options: the first is to 
use a public charge post that is faster but more expensive per service, and the second is to install a private 
charge post that is slower but cheaper. These two options are considered in the benchmark model, and the 
service values provided by a public post and a private post can be formulated as 𝑣𝑃 and 𝑣𝐼 respectively. 
Consumers’ valuation of charge posts relies more on their speeds than locations (Wolff & Madlener, 2019). 
Almost all city residents in China live in condos, and they have to install private charge posts in community 
parking lots (underground or surface). To EV drivers in metropolitan areas, therefore, private and public 
charge posts are not that different in accessibility. Rather, charging speeds vary significantly between the 
two options due to their distinct technologies and power ratings (Dong, Liu, & Lin, 2014; IEA, 2020; Leea, 
Chakrabortyb, Hardmanb et al., 2020). Thus, the service value of a public charge post is higher than that of 
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a private one: 𝑣𝑃 > 𝑣𝐼. Even if EV drivers use their own posts, quicker charging still makes a difference 
by giving them more flexibility in travel planning and trip making. 
In addition to charging speed, service utility also depends on consumer charging service 
preference, x, which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. A larger value indicates a lower 
perceptional “discount” on the valuation of a charge post to a consumer. 
Utility from using a public charge post: 
𝑈𝑃 = 𝑣𝑃𝑥 − 𝑃𝑃 . (1) 
Utility from using a private charge post: 
𝑈𝐼 = 𝑣𝐼𝑥 − 𝐶𝐼 − (𝑊𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼). (2) 
Assuming that the percentage of consumers installing private charge posts is 𝑞𝐼, and the percentage 
of consumers choosing public charge posts is 𝑞𝑃, and 𝑞𝑃 = 1 − 𝑞𝐼. An indifferent consumer derives the 
equal utility from both charging options: 𝑈𝑃(𝑥) = 𝑈𝐼(𝑥) . Solving the equation, the cutoff consumer 
preference between using private and public posts is 𝑥 =
𝑃𝑃−𝐶𝐼−𝑊𝐼−𝑂𝐼
𝑣𝑃−𝑣𝐼
. Based on the uniform distribution 





3.3 Stackelberg Game of the Benchmark Case 
Among game theory models, Stackelberg game is able to handle the EV charging market as a 
multiagent system in which players make decisions sequentially based on heterogeneous strategies (i.e., 
leader vs. follower). In the benchmark model, there are three players: electricity distributor, public charging 
infrastructure operator, and EV consumers. As shown in Figure 3, the distributor decides the wholesale 
electricity rate first due to its strong bargaining power (Zhu, Zhang, Lu et al., 2017). Then the operator 
decides the construction quantity of public charge posts and charging service price. Finally, each consumer 




Fig.3. The timeline of Stackelberg game in the benchmark case. 
The electricity distributor only decides the wholesale rate for the public charging infrastructure 
operator, 𝑊𝑃, whereas the rate for private charge posts 𝑊𝐼 is fixed as an exogenous variable. Facilitating 
model solution, such a setup also reflects what is in the practice. Public posts are directly connected to the 
grid, allowing the electricity distributor to set the wholesale rate based on the demand. Meanwhile, most 
private posts are indirectly connected to the grid through residential circuits, and their usage is charged at 
the same electricity rate as other household appliances. Distributor profit can be formulated as: 
𝜋𝐷 = 𝑊𝐼𝑞𝐼 + 𝑊𝑃𝑞𝑃 − 𝑐, (3) 
where 𝑐 represents the marginal cost of electricity for the distributor. 
The operator decides the number of public charge posts to be constructed, 𝑁𝑃, and the charging 
service price, 𝑃𝑃. Operator profit can be formulated as: 





Solving the first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing operator and distributor yields the 
equilibrium prices and sales as summarized in Lemma 1 (see Appendix for all proofs). 
Lemma 1. In the benchmark case without considering charge post sharing, the equilibrium price of public 
charging infrastructure operator is 𝑃𝑃
∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
3
4
(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼) +
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
4𝜃𝑃
, and the equilibrium price 
1. Distributor decides the 
wholesale rate of electricity 
2. Operator decides the construction quantity  
and charging price of public posts 
3. Consumer chooses between 
 private and public posts 
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of electricity distributor is 𝑊𝑃
∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
1
2
(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 −
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
𝜃𝑃














 for private ones. 
Table 2 reports a sensitivity analysis for a better understanding of Lemma 1. There exists a negative 
relationship between 𝐶𝐼 and 𝑞𝐼
∗ : the increase of private charge post construction costs will incur the 
decrease of private post equilibrium sales. An increase in any private charge post costs, including 
construction cost (𝐶𝐼), operation cost (𝑂𝐼) and electricity wholesale cost (𝑊𝐼), or the improvement of public 
charge post value (𝑣𝑃) will trigger both public charging infrastructure operator and electricity distributor to 
raise their service price (𝑃𝑃
∗) and wholesale rate (𝑊𝑃
∗). Similarly, an increase in private charge post value 
(𝑣𝐼) will trigger public charging infrastructure operator and electricity distributor to reduce their service 
price (𝑃𝑃
∗) and wholesale rate (𝑊𝑃
∗). Meanwhile, a decrease in public charge post operation cost (𝑂𝑃), 
construction cost (𝐶𝑃), or an increase in average public post service volume (𝜃𝑃) will trigger the operator 
to reduce the charge service price (𝑃𝑃
∗) and the distributor to raise the electricity wholesale rate (𝑊𝑃
∗). 
Finally, an increase in private charge post construction cost (𝐶𝐼), operation cost (𝑂𝐼) or average service 
volume (𝜃𝐼) or a decrease in public post operation cost (𝑂𝑃) will incur more public post charge sales (𝑞𝑃
∗) 
but less private post charge sales (𝑞𝐼
∗). 
Table 2. Sensitivity analysis of benchmark model 
 𝐶𝐼 𝐶𝑃 𝑂𝐼 𝑂𝑃 𝑊𝐼 𝑣𝐼 𝑣𝑃 𝜃𝑃 
𝑃𝑃
∗ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ － ＋ － 
𝑊𝑃
∗ ＋ － ＋ － ＋ － ＋ ＋ 
𝑞𝑃
∗ ＋ － ＋ － N/A － ＋ ＋ 
𝑞𝐼
∗ － ＋ － ＋ N/A ＋ － － 





4. Sharing Model 
4.1 Private Charge Post Sharing 
This study assumes that all owners choose to share their private charge posts. Before joining the 
sharing platform, an owner needs to upgrade post construction to payment and security standards. The 
sharing upgrade construction cost is denoted as 𝐶𝑆. Sharing a private charge post reduces the utility to its 
owner in terms of convenience, who needs to pre-arrange his/her charging schedule without much flexibility. 
The value of a shared private post to its owner is denoted as 𝑣𝐼𝑆, and 𝑣𝐼𝑆 < 𝑣𝐼. Once private charge posts 
are shared, consumers have the option to rent them for EV charging. The value of shared posts to non-owner 
consumers is lower than that of owners, 𝑣𝑆 < 𝑣𝐼𝑆, due to less convenience. Although the sharing of charge 
posts reduces their values to owners, it generates revenue at the price of 𝑃𝑆 per charging service.  
 
Fig.4. The charging supply chain in the sharing case. 
When owner consumers share their private charge posts, there exists an average charging service 
volume, denoted as 𝜃𝐼. How frequent a charge post can serve its owner and other consumers depends on 




Consumers using public 
charging infrastructure 
Consumers installing and sharing 
private charge posts 




buyers, and sellers. As shown in Figure 4, when owner consumers use private posts to charge EVs, they 
play the role of buyers; when they lease their posts to others, they play the role of sellers. 
4.2 Consumer Behavior in the Sharing Case 
Three charging options are available for a consumer in the sharing case: using a public post, using 
one’s own post, using a shared post. Assuming that the number of owners sharing their posts is 𝑞𝐼𝑆, and 
the number of non-owner consumers using the shared posts is 𝑞𝑆 = (𝜃𝐼 − 1)𝑞𝐼𝑆 . The utility that a 
consumer derives from using a public post is the same as that in the benchmark case. The utilities concerning 
private post sharing can be formulated as follows. 
When a consumer uses a shared post as a non-owner: 
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑣𝑆𝑥 − 𝑃𝑆 . (5) 
When an owner shares a post: 
𝑈𝐼𝑆 = 𝑣𝐼𝑆𝑥 − (𝐶𝐼 + 𝐶𝑆) + 𝑃𝑆(𝜃𝐼 − 1) − (𝑊𝐼𝜃𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼). (6) 
The volume of consumers using the public charging infrastructure is 𝑞𝑃 = 1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑆 − 𝑞𝑆 . The 
choice-making of each consumer among three charging options for utility maximization can be determined 
with two indifference points 𝑥1 and 𝑥2. Consumers within the range from 0 to 𝑥1 tend to rent shared 
private charge posts, consumers within the range from 𝑥1 to 𝑥2 are likely to own and share posts, and 
consumers within the range from 𝑥2 to 1 prefer public charge posts. Indifferent consumers at 𝑥1 obtain 
the same utility from renting shared posts and owning private posts, but suffer a loss using public charge 
posts. Indifferent consumers at 𝑥2 obtain the same utility from owning private posts and using public posts, 
but suffer a loss renting shared private posts.  
The indifferent consumer who derives equal utility from sharing his/her own post and using a 
shared post can be located by solving 𝑈𝑆(𝑥1) = 𝑈𝐼𝑆(𝑥1), where 𝑥1 denotes the cutoff preference between 
using private and shared posts. Another indifferent consumer who derived equal utility from sharing his/her 
own post and using a public post can be located by solving 𝑈𝐼𝑆(𝑥2) = 𝑈𝑃(𝑥2), where 𝑥2 denotes the 
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 and 𝑥2 = 𝜃𝐼
𝐶𝐼+𝐶𝑆+𝑂𝐼+𝜃𝐼(𝑊𝐼−𝑃𝑃)
𝐾1𝐾2
 . Then the sales of shared posts are 𝑞𝐼𝑆 =
𝐶𝐼+𝐶𝑆+𝑂𝐼+𝜃𝐼(𝑊𝐼−𝑃𝑃)
𝐾1𝐾2






 , where 𝐾1 = 𝜃𝐼 − 1 +
𝜃𝐼(𝑣𝐼𝑆−𝑣𝑃)
𝐾2
 and 𝐾2 = 𝑣𝐼𝑆 − 𝑣𝑆 − 𝜃𝐼(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝑆). 
4.3 Stackelberg Game of the Sharing Case 
In the sharing model, the electricity distributor first decides the wholesale rate of electricity. Then 
the public charging infrastructure operator decides the volume of charging infrastructures and charging 
service price. Finally, each consumer makes a choice among three charging options. 
 
Fig.5. The timeline of Stackelberg game in the sharing case. 
The electricity distributor only decides the wholesale rate for the public charging infrastructure 
operator, 𝑊𝑃. The rate for private posts 𝑊𝐼 is a constant. Distributor profit can be formulated as: 
𝜋𝐷 = 𝑊𝐼(𝑞𝑆 + 𝑞𝐼𝑆) + 𝑊𝑃𝑞𝑃 − 𝑐, (7) 
where 𝑐 represents the marginal cost of the distributor to obtain electricity. 
The public charging infrastructure operator decides the construction number of posts, 𝑁𝑃 , and 
charging service price, 𝑃𝑃. Operator profit can be formulated as: 
𝜋𝑂 = 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑃 − (𝑊𝑃𝑞𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑃) − 𝐶𝑃𝑁𝑃 , (8) 
1. Distributor decides the 
wholesale rate of electricity 
2. Operator decides the construction quantity  
and charging price of public posts 
3. Consumer chooses among private, 







. Solving the first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing operator and distributor yields 
the equilibrium prices and sales, as summarized by Lemma 2. In the benchmark case without considering 
charge post sharing, the equilibrium charging price of public posts is 𝑃𝑃
∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
3
4
(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼) +
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
4𝜃𝑃
 , the equilibrium rate of the distributor is 𝑊𝑃
∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
1
2
(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 −
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
𝜃𝑃
+ 𝑂𝐼) , and the 















Lemma 2. In the sharing case considering charge post sharing, the equilibrium charging price of public 
posts is 𝑃𝑃












, the equilibrium rate of the distributor is 𝑊𝑃







































 and 𝐾2 = 𝑣𝐼𝑆 − 𝑣𝑆 − 𝜃𝐼(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝑆). 
Table 3 gives the sensitivity analysis for a better understanding of Lemma 2. There exists a negative 
relation between 𝐶𝐼 and 𝑞𝐼𝑆
∗∗: the increase in private post construction will incur a decrease in average 
private post charging volume. An increase in any private post costs, including construction cost (𝐶𝐼), sharing 
upgrade cost (𝐶𝑆), operation cost (𝑂𝐼) and electricity wholesale cost (𝑊𝐼), or the improvement of charging 
service value ( 𝑣𝑃 , 𝑣𝐼𝑆  and 𝑣𝑆 ) will trigger public charging infrastructure operator and electricity 
distributor to raise service price (𝑃𝑃
∗∗) and wholesale rate (𝑊𝑃
∗∗) respectively. In terms of public posts, a 
decrease in operation cost (𝑂𝑃) or construction cost (𝐶𝑃) or an increase in average charging service volume 
(𝜃𝑃) will trigger the operator to reduce the service price (𝑃𝑃
∗∗) but the electricity distributor to raise the 
wholesale rate (𝑊𝑃
∗∗). Any increases in private post costs and average charging service volume or decreases 
in public post costs will incur more public post sales (𝑞𝑃




Table3. Sensitivity analysis of sharing model. 
 𝐶𝐼 𝐶𝑆 𝐶𝑃 𝑂𝐼 𝑂𝑃 𝑊𝐼 𝑣𝐼𝑆 𝑣𝑃 𝑣𝑆 𝜃𝑃 
𝑃𝑃
∗∗ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ － 
𝑊𝑃
∗∗ ＋ ＋ － ＋ － ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ 
𝑞𝑃
∗∗ ＋ ＋ － ＋ － N/A － － ＋ ＋ 
𝑞𝐼𝑆
∗∗ － － ＋ － ＋ N/A ＋ － ＋ － 
Note: N/A – not applicable (i.e., no/weak relationship) 
5. Observations 
The equilibria obtained in lemma 1 and lemma 2 can be compared to assess the impacts of private 
charge post sharing on public post service price, electricity wholesale rate and consumer charging choice. 
The results are summarized in the following observations. 
Observation 1. The lower the sharing upgrade cost (𝐶𝑆), the lower the public post service price (𝑃𝑃
∗∗) and 
electricity wholesale rate (𝑊𝑃
∗∗). 
Case 1. When the upgrading cost is relatively high, 𝐶𝑆 > (𝜃𝐼 − 1)(𝐶𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼) + 𝜃𝐼(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼) +
𝐾1𝐾2
𝜃𝐼
 , the 
operator may raise the charging service price of public posts (𝑃𝑃
∗ < 𝑃𝑃
∗∗), and the electricity distributor 
may raise the wholesale rate for public posts (𝑊𝑃
∗ < 𝑊𝑃
∗∗), as R1 and R3 depict in Fig. 6. 




public charging infrastructure operator may reduce the service price (𝑃𝑃
∗ > 𝑃𝑃
∗∗ ), and the electricity 
distributor may raise the wholesale rate for the operator (𝑊𝑃
∗ > 𝑊𝑃
∗∗), as R2 and R4 depict in Fig. 6. 
Observation 2. The lower the sharing upgrade cost, the lower the profits of public charging infrastructure 
operator (𝜋𝑂

















− 1  and 𝐾6 = √
𝐾1𝐾2
𝑣𝐼−𝑣𝑃
− 𝜃𝐼 , the profits of public charging infrastructure operator and 




∗), as R1 and R2 depict in Fig. 6. 









), the profits 





∗ ), as R3 and R4 depict in Fig. 6.  
 
Fig.6. Price and profit shifts from benchmark to sharing. (𝐶𝐼 = 10, 𝑂𝐼 = 6) 
Price hiking does not always lift profitability. In Fig. 6, for example, R3 indicates that when the 
public charging infrastructure operator raises the service price, its profit may suffer due to the loss of market 
share to private post sharing. As for the electricity distributor, R2 suggests that the cut in wholesale rate 
leads to lower public post service price, which brings more profit to the operator as well as the distributor. 
When the sharing upgrade cost decreases or the average service volume increases, as shown in R4, more 
consumers rent private charge posts, making the public charging infrastructure operator less profitable. 
Observation 3. The sharing upgrade cost of private posts influences the choice-making of consumers. 
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Case 1. When the sharing upgrade cost is lower than a certain threshold, 𝐶𝑆 < 𝑀𝐼𝑁, fewer consumers 
choose public posts, 𝑁𝑃
∗ > 𝑁𝑃
∗∗. Accordingly, the demand for shared private posts increases, 𝑁𝐼
∗ < 𝑁𝐼
∗∗. 
Case 2. When the sharing upgrade cost is higher than a certain threshold, 𝐶𝑆 > 𝑀𝐴𝑋, more consumers 
choose public posts, 𝑁𝑃
∗ < 𝑁𝑃
∗∗. Accordingly, the demand for private posts decreases, 𝑁𝐼
∗ > 𝑁𝐼
∗∗. 
Case 3. When the sharing upgrade cost is moderate, 𝑀𝐼𝑁 < 𝐶𝑆 < 𝑀𝐴𝑋 . If 𝐾3 (
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
𝜃𝑃
− 𝐶𝐼 − 𝑂𝐼) >






 , the demand for public posts decreases, 𝑁𝑃
∗ > 𝑁𝑃
∗∗ , but the 
demand for private posts increases, 𝑁𝐼
∗ > 𝑁𝐼
∗∗ . If 𝐾3 (
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
𝜃𝑃







, the demand for public posts increases, 𝑁𝑃
∗ < 𝑁𝑃













− 𝐶𝐼 − 𝑂𝐼)} , 𝑀𝐼𝑁 =









− 𝐶𝐼 − 𝑂𝐼)}, 𝐾3 =
𝐾1𝐾2
𝑣𝐼−𝑣𝑃




and 𝐾3 > 𝐾4 > 0. 
Fig. 7 explores how the demands for public and private posts shift from the benchmark case to the 
sharing case under the influence of private post service volume 𝜃𝐼 and upgrade cost 𝐶𝑆. R1 suggests that 
a higher 𝐶𝑆 reduces the demand for private posts. Meanwhile, R2 shows that a higher 𝜃𝐼 reduces the 
demand for public posts. Typically, an increase in the demand for private posts typically leads to a decrease 
in the demand for public posts, as R4 depicts. However, there is an exception as R3 indicates: when 𝜃𝐼 is 




Fig.7. Market demand shifts from benchmark to sharing. (𝐶𝐼 = 5, 𝑂𝐼 = 6) 
6. Numerical Analyses 
To further explore the critical success factor of private charge post sharing, a numerical study is 
conducted. The first step is to determine the constant values of exogenous variables based on real-world 
data. For demonstration purposes, this study adopts relevant values from China, as listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Exogenous variables in the case of China. 
Exogenous variable Value (CNY) Residual lifetime (year) 
Cost of a 40 kW DC public charge post 120,000 15 
Cost of an 11 kW AC private charge post 10,000 5 
Upgrade cost for sharing an AC private charge post 5,000 5 
Unit electricity rate for residents (1 kWh) 0.4983 - 
Unit electricity marginal cost (1 kWh) 0.27 - 
Operation cost of a public charge post 27,000 1 
Operation cost of a private charge post  1000 1 
Source：Zhu, Zhang, Lu et al. (2017); Zhao, Cai, and Ma (2018); State Grid in China (2017); Zhang, 
Li, Zhu et al. (2018). 
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Each EV has a range of 300 km and a battery of 45 kWh capacity. Considering the energy 
conversion efficiency, 50 kWh is needed to fully charge the battery. Assuming all EVs are recharged every 
day, model parameters are estimated in Table 5. 
Table 5. Model parameter estimates. 
Parameter Estimate  Parameter Estimate 
𝐶𝑃 21.92  𝜃𝑃 8 
𝐶𝐼 5.49  𝜃𝐼 2 
𝐶𝑆 2.75  𝑣𝑃 100 
𝑂𝑃 73.97  𝑣𝐼 80 
𝑂𝐼 2.74  𝑣𝐼𝑆 75 
𝑐 13.50  𝑣𝑆 70 
𝑊𝐼 24.92    
A public charge post can handle up to eight EVs per day (State Grid in China, 2017), and a shared 
private post takes care of two EVs on average. Service value is estimated by comparing the cost of EV 
charging to the fueling of a regular car as an alternative means of transportation. In China, the latest 2016 
standard for fuel consumption of a passenger vehicle is 6.7 L per 100 km on the highway. Considering the 
braking and traffic in local driving, 10 L per 100 km is a realistic estimate for commuters. Based on the 
average 2019 fuel price in China, CNY225 is needed to travel 300 km for regular cars. Due to the relative 
sparseness of charging facilities, EV drivers are often more concerned about the travel range. Thus, this 
study gives CNY100 and CNY80 as conservative estimates of charge service values for public and private 
posts, respectively. Consumers are sensitive to charging time, and the service value of a private post is 
relatively low due to its slower speed. Different levels of inconvenience cost will incur when consumers 
share their own posts or rent others' posts. Correspondingly, the service value of a shared post is CNY75 
for an owner and CNY70 for a non-owner.  
Based on the estimated parameters, the results of the numerical study are obtained. First, they 
confirm the aforementioned observations, as shown in Table 6. 
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𝜋𝑂 0.8246 0.9288 
𝜋𝐷 5.0641 5.2727 
𝑃𝑃 49.0800 51.7100 
𝑁𝑃 0.0254 0.0235 
𝑁𝐼 0.7970 0.4059 
𝑞𝑃 20.31% 18.81% 
𝑞𝐼(𝑞𝐼𝑆) 79.69% 39.10% 
𝑊𝑃 34.7900 33.0400 
𝑃𝑆 - 29.3900 
𝑞𝑆 - 40.59% 
Fig. 8 compares the market shares in the absence and presence of private post sharing. As for the 
benchmark case, 20.31% of consumers use public charge posts, while the others install private posts. In the 
sharing case, 18.81% of consumers remain loyal to the public charging infrastructure, whereas 40.6% share 
their posts with the rest. Thus, numerical analyses suggest that in the sharing economy, fewer consumers 
have to install private charge posts but rent from others through P2P, which does not affect B2C much. 
 
Fig.8. Consumer choice-making in benchmark and sharing cases.  
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In the sharing case, 7.36% fewer consumers choose public posts, but the public charging 
infrastructure operator still sees a profit increase by 12.65%. The loyal consumers of public posts have a 
relatively high preference for the faster charging speed. Even the operator increases the service price by 
5.36%, and such consumers still remain loyal. Beyond that, they turn to shared posts, which brings down 
the profit of public charging infrastructure operators. To avoid such situations, the public operator should 
increase the service value by using different strategies to expedite charging (Ucer, Kisacikoglu, Yuksel et 
al., 2019) or improving consumer experiences (e.g. food and entertainment services). 
Private charge post sharing is also attractive to consumers. In the numerical study, the service price 
of shared posts is 43.17% lower than that of public ones, and the profit per service is CNY3.10, 62.83% of 
the public ones. As the sharing of charge posts helps their owners cover installation costs, it encourages 
more private capital investment in the EV charging market (private: 49.06%; public: 7.35%; overall: 
44.37%). 
Fig. 9 compares how critical success factors concerning private post sharing, including the value 
of sharing (based on charging speed), sharing upgrade cost, average service volume, electricity wholesale 
rate, construction cost, and operation cost, affect the EV charging market comprising B2C and P2P. As 
shown in Fig. 9 (a) and (c), the increases in the value of sharing and average service volume of private 
charge posts (i.e., 𝑣𝐼𝑆 and 𝜃𝐼) lead to P2P expansion but B2C contraction. As shown in Fig. 9 (b), (e) and 
(f), the increases in the upgrade, construction and operation costs of private charge posts (i.e., 𝐶𝑆, 𝐶𝐼and 
𝑂𝐼) lead to P2P contraction but B2C expansion. Fig. 9 (d) suggests that the increase in the electricity rate 
for private charge posts (i.e., 𝑊𝐼) does not make a big difference in the charging market. To promote P2P 
growth in the charging market, therefore, it is vital to increase the value and volume of private post sharing 
but reduce its costs. The average service volume is impactful on consumer choice at the onset from 1 to 2, 
but the curve flats out later on. While the charging technology will advance in the long run, a new sharing 
platform may improve supply-demand matching efficiency (e.g., with the help of sophisticated algorithms 














7. Consumer Subsidization 
This section considers how the government is supposed to subsidize consumers for installing and 
sharing private charge posts. The purpose is to use the subsidy case as a baseline to the sharing case to 
quantify the effect of private charge post sharing. First, the subsidy case is modeled base on the benchmark 
case. In the subsidy case, the government subsidizes consumers for installing private charge posts, and the 
subsidy is denoted as 𝑆𝐼. The utility a consumer derives from using a public post is the same as in the 
benchmark case, and the utility a consumer derives from using the private post can be formulated as follow. 
𝑈𝐼 = 𝑣𝐼𝑥 − 𝐶𝐼 − (𝑊𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼) + 𝑆𝐼 . (9) 
The profit function stays the same, and solving the first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing 
operator and distributor yields the equilibria as summarized by Lemma 3.  
Lemma 3. When a consumer subsidy is provided by the government and no private post sharing is 
considered, the equilibrium price of public charging infrastructures is 𝑃𝑃
∗∗∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
3
4
(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 +
𝑂𝐼 − 𝑆𝐼) +
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
4𝜃𝑃
 , the equilibrium rate of electricity distributor is 𝑊𝑃
∗∗∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
1
2
(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 −
𝐶𝑃+𝑂𝑃
𝜃𝑃


















Fig.10. Effects of sharing and subsidization at 𝜃𝐼 = 2. 
 
 
Fig.11. Effects of sharing and subsidization at 𝜃𝐼 = 3. 
 
Fig.12. Effects of sharing and subsidization at 𝜃𝐼 = 4. 
To examine how consumer subsidization interacts with post sharing in promoting the growth of EV 
charging market, five scenarios are compared based on the parameter estimates in Section 5. As shown in 
Fig. 10-12, extra attention is paid to the average charging service volume of private posts at three levels (𝜃𝐼 
= 2, 3 and 4). The black dash-dotted line refers to the benchmark case in which there is neither sharing nor 
subsidization. The blue solid line depicts that the government subsidizes the installation of private charge 
posts for no sharing at the variable rate corresponding to the horizontal axis of Subsidy Level. The green 
dashed line shows that there is no subsidization in the case of post sharing. Finally, the yellow dash-dotted 
line and purple dotted line indicate consumer subsidy at 20% and 30%, respectively, in the context of post 
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sharing. For comparison across benchmark and sharing cases, the calculation of subsidy amount is based 
on private post installation cost 𝐶𝐼, but the government may as well subsidize the upgrade cost for post 
sharing with the same amount. 
In all three figures, the number of private charge posts installed in the presence of sharing economy 
is greater than the benchmark case of no sharing. In the sharing case, the number of private charge posts 
installed at the 30% subsidy level exceeds that at the 20% level. As for no sharing but subsidization, the 
number of private charge posts installed will rise as the incentive increases, and gradually exceed that in all 
other scenarios. The average charging service volume of private posts has a positive impact on the number 
of private charge posts installed in the sharing economy. The number of private charge posts installed in the 
sharing case without subsidization is equal to that in the no-sharing case at the subsidy level of 21% in Fig. 
10 (𝜃𝐼 = 2), 43% in Fig. 11 (𝜃𝐼 = 3), and 50% in Fig. 12 (𝜃𝐼 = 4). Therefore, when the average service 
volume of private charge posts is relatively low, as in the case of China, consumer subsidization is still 
effective in accelerating their installation and sharing. 
8. Conclusions and Implications 
This study establishes a Stackelberg game model for the sharing economy of private charge posts 
in which the emerging P2P among dual-identity consumers competes with the existing B2C. It examines 
the impacts of charge post sharing on the pricing strategies of public charging infrastructure operator and 
electricity distributor, as well as how it affects post construction and is affected by consumer subsidization. 
The findings suggest that such a new form of P2P SCC attracts non-governmental investment in the EV 
industry chain for green travel, similar to the crowdfunding on public charging infrastructure. 
This study contributes to the literature of sharing economy in the context of EV charging with the 
modeling of a market structure comprising competing B2C and P2P components. It establishes benchmark 
and sharing models to compare service pricing and the number of charge posts installed in the absence and 
presence of private post sharing. The findings enrich the research on P2P SCC in the field of transportation 
policy by providing theoretical support for the promotion of private charge post sharing. Policy-makers can 
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assess the extent to which the emerging sharing economy helps reduce market dependence on governmental 
investment, and understand how to support the healthy development of this critical link in the EV industry 
chain with appropriate consumer subsidization. 
This study yields useful implications for both researchers and practitioners. First of all, private 
charge post sharing benefits consumers, public charging infrastructure operators, electricity distributors, 
and the government. For owner consumers, sharing their charge posts generates rental income. For non-
owner consumers, using shared posts provides a cheaper charging option. For public charging infrastructure 
operators and electricity distributors, the existence of loyal consumers provides a possibility to actually 
enhance profitability. For the government, private post sharing accelerates the expansion of EV charging 
market for green travel.  
The sharing economy brings about significant behavioral changes of EV market stakeholders. 
When private charge posts are shared, the enhanced equipment utilization reduces the need for the 
government to build public charging infrastructure. Rather, it may encourage EV drivers to install and share 
charge posts with consumer subsidization that is relatively affordable and controllable. By playing the 
additional role of suppliers, consumers enjoy more options and make the best choice considering cost, speed, 
and convenience. Accordingly, public charging infrastructure operators and electricity distributors need to 
adjust their pricing strategies. Furthermore, the operator may improve service values (e.g., faster charging 
speed, complimentary snack/drink) to attract and retain customers as their loyalty is critical to its market 
share and profitability. The distributor can adjust power grid configurations to cope with the increasing 
electricity demands from private posts.  
The average service volume plays an important role in the success of private charge post sharing. 
To increase the volume quickly, a P2P SCC platform must improve the efficiency of supply-demand 
matching through the use of sophisticated information technologies (e.g., artificial intelligence) or even 
cross-platform cooperation. In the long run, the improvement of charging speed will gradually lift the 
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average service volume. To accelerate this trend, the government can support the research on quick charging 
technology, and the electricity distributor may modernize power grids in needed areas. 
Though numerical analyses are based on the values collected from China, the general inference and 
methodology are applicable to other settings. To promote private charge post sharing, for instance, the 
results suggest that consumer subsidization at a reasonable level is worth considering by policy-makers. 
Therefore, a well-formulated incentive program such as the partial or full subsidization of the upgrade cost 
for sharing private charge posts is likely to encourage owners to lease them. Stackelberg game based on the 
dual identity of consumers as buyers and sellers can also be used to model other forms of peer-to-peer 
resource sharing economy, such as parking lot sharing.  
This study has limitations that point to future research directions. It assumes that all consumers 
enjoy the same opportunity to install private charge posts, but it is often not true in the real world. For 
example, private posts are prohibited in many residential communities in China due to powerline conditions. 
In future research, it is necessary to pay attention to such a barrier to private charge post sharing, as a 
significant percentage of consumers may not have the access to shared posts due to their sparsity in certain 
areas. In addition, the assumption of a fixed electricity rate for shared private charge posts 𝑊𝐼 is conducive 
to model solution, but electricity distributors may provide floating rates based on the usage and time of 
charging (e.g., rate can be lower after midnight till morning). Freeing the constraint on 𝑊𝐼 help establish 
more flexible decision-making models for consumers as well as electricity distributors, as an increasing 
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Proof of Lemma 1. Using the reverse induction method, first solving the operator’s profit maximization 
problem 




, 𝑞𝑃 = 1 −
𝑃𝑃−𝐶𝐼−𝑊𝐼−𝑂𝐼
𝑣𝑃−𝑣𝐼
. And the optimal 𝑃𝑃 can be formulated as a function of 𝑊𝑃. 




Subsites eq. (11) into the distributor’s profit maximization problem 
𝜋𝐷 = 𝑊𝐼𝑞𝐼 + 𝑊𝑃𝑞𝑃 − 𝑐. (12) 
Solving the previous problem by first order condition, the optimal 𝑊𝑃 can be formulated as 
𝑊𝑃
∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
1
2
(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 −
𝐶𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃
𝜃𝑃
+ 𝑂𝐼) . (13) 
Subsites eq. (13) into eq. (11), and the optimal 𝑃𝑃 can be formulated as 
𝑃𝑃
∗ = 𝑊𝐼 +
3
4






















Proof of Lemma 2. Similar to the proof of lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Similar to the proof of lemma 1. 






((𝜃𝐼 − 1)(𝐶𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼) − 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜃𝐼(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼) +
𝐾1𝐾2
𝜃𝐼






((𝜃𝐼 − 1)(𝐶𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼) − 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜃𝐼(𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼) +
𝐾1𝐾2
𝜃𝐼
) . (18) 
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Proof of Observation 2. Similar to the proof of observation 1. 
Proof of Observation 3. Similar to the proof of observation 1. 




















































































































































































Where 𝐶𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃 − 𝜃𝑃(𝑂𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼) > 0 and 𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 > 0. 
∎ 
































































































































































































































Where 𝐶𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃 − 𝜃𝑃(𝑂𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼) > 0, 𝐾1𝐾2 < 0 and 𝑣𝑃 − 𝑣𝐼 > 0. 
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